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Excitement surrounding hostile takeovers has been renewed in light of the attempted 
takeover of Adcock Ingram, by Bidvest.1 The plot thickened when the bid was 
challenged by CFR Pharmaceuticals.2 It seems as if Adcock successfully warded off the 
hostile takeover by Bidvest, thereby continuing the tendency of hostile takeovers to fail 
in South Africa.3 
 
The above has drawn attention to the ability of a target company to take frustrating 
action to defend against a hostile takeover bid and the extent to which the takeover 
provisions in the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (‘the 2008 Act’) and its Regulations provide 
the room to do so.4 I will argue that, in the spirit of the Act, which replaced the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 (‘the 1973 Act’), the takeover provisions should have the 
inherent flexibility to allow the directors and/or shareholders to take frustrating action.5 
This has long been a controversial area of Company law in many jurisdictions.6 
 
The 2008 Act came into effect on 1 May 2011.7 The takeover regime remains largely 
unchanged.8 When using the term ‘takeover’ one refers not to the transactions but 














adcock (last accessed 14  September 2013); Philip Sutherland ‘Shareholder Democracy in South Africa?’ in M. 
Olaerts & C.A. Schwarz Shareholder Democracy: An Analysis of Shareholder Involvement in Corporate Policies’ 
(2012) 79 at 96. 
4
 www.bdlive.co.za/business/healthcare/2013/04/08/bidvest-to-pull-out-all-stops (last accessed 14 September 2013). 
5
 See generally, Jared Nickig ‘Hat’s Off, Gentlemen (and Ladies), to One of Your Greatest Generals’ (July 2011) 
Without Prejudice: Company International Law 22. 
6
 Darryl Levitt and Katherine Bee ‘Surviving the Hostile Bid’ (January/ February 2009) 2 Inside Mining 40 at 41. 
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rather to the effect of those transactions where they have resulted in a change of 
control.9 
 
I will rely on the regime in the United States (‘the US’), particularly Delaware, where 
over half of the companies in the United States are incorporated.10 Delaware has a 
court run regime which allows much flexibility and allows for the natural development of 
the law, as opposed to hard and fast rules.11 I will also have regard to the regime in the 
United Kingdom (‘the UK’), given that our system is largely based thereon.12 Lastly, I will 
refer to the takeover regime in Australia, which is considered the ‘middle ground’ 
between the UK and the US.13 Throughout this paper I will bear in mind that the South 
African economic climate differs from that of its international counterparts.14 However, 
South African legislation needs to be such that it fosters economic growth, whilst being 
sensitive to our political history.15 
 
The Paper will consist of five chapters. In the first chapter I will discuss important 
definitions and the difference between a hostile and a friendly takeover. In the second 
chapter I will discuss the operation, effect and theories underlying the concept of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
8
 Ezra Davids, Trevor Norwitz and David Yuill ‘A Microscopic Analysis of the New Merger and Amalgamation 
Provision in the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ (2010) Acta Juridica: Modern Company Law for a Competitive South 
African Economy 337 at 337.  
9
 ME Matsaneng ‘Corporate Control Transactions in South Africa’ (2010) Transactions of the Centre for Business 
Law: The Role and Consequences of Pure Corporate Control and Corporate Social Responsibility in the Republic 
South Africa and the United States of America 75 at 84-85; Maleka Femida Cassim and Jacqueline Yeats 
‘Fundamental Transactions, Takeovers and Offers’ in Farouk HI Cassim, Maleka Femida Cassim, Rehana Cassim et 
al Contemporary Company Law 2ed (2012) 672 at 731; MA Weinberg and MV Blank Take-overs and Mergers 4ed 
(1979) at 3. 
10
 Albert O “Chip” Saulsbury, IV ‘The Availability of Takeover Defenses and Deal Protection Devices for Anglo-
American Target Companies’ (2012) Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 115 at 118. 
11
 See generally, Saulsbury op cit note 10. 
12
 Haslam v Sefalana 1998 (4) SA 964 (W) at para 975J. 
13
 Nigel Boardman ‘Critical Analysis of the New South African Takeover Laws as Proposed under the Companies 
Act 71 of 2008’ (2010) Acta Juridica: Modern Company Law for a Competitive South African Economy 306 at 332-
333. 
14
 ME Matsaneng ‘The Meaning of Corporate Control’ (2010) Transactions of the Centre for Business Law: The 
Role and Consequences of Pure Corporate Control and Corporate Social Responsibility in South Africa and the 
United States of America 10 at 29. 
15











hostile takeover. The third chapter will set out the Regulatory Regime of frustrating 
action in South Africa which consists of the Companies Act containing the Takeover 
Regulations and establishing a Takeover Regulation Panel (‘the TRP’).16 The fourth 
chapter analyses who should make the decision to take a frustrating action to thwart a 
hostile takeover.17 The fifth chapter will consider the takeover regimes in the UK, the US 
and Australia in order to compare them to that of South Africa in order to determine how 
best to apply or amend our current regime. Finally, I will consider how appropriate 
hostile takeovers are in the South African context and how a company can defend 
against it. I will argue that absolute power should not lie with the shareholders and that 




                                                           
16
 The TRP is regulated in terms of Part C of Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 1: Preliminary Definitions  
In this chapter I will discuss the definition of ‘takeover’ and the difference between that 
and a ‘takeover bid’.18 Closely connected to this is the definition of ‘control’.19 Lastly, I 
will discuss the difference between a hostile and a friendly takeover.20 
 
Definition of a Takeover 
Takeovers focus on the effect that a transaction has and whether it results in the 
acquisition, consolidation or change of control.21 A ‘takeover’ occurs when an individual 
or a company, through a transaction, acquires control (or takes over) the assets or 
management of another company whereas a ‘takeover bid’ is a means of carrying out a 
takeover.22 The aim is to utilize it to enable the acquirer to obtain sufficient shares in the 
company to enable him to exercise voting control.23  
 
Definition of Control 
The definition of ‘control’ is similar to that under the previous regime.24 Under the 1973 
Act it was defined as: 
 
a holding or aggregate holding of shares or other securities in a company entitling the 
holder thereof to exercise, or cause to be exercised, directly or indirectly, the specified 
percentage or more of the voting rights at meetings of that company or any company 
                                                           
18
 Weinberg and Blank op cit note 9 at 3. 
19
 Regulation 81(e). 
20
 Carl Stein with Geoff Everingham The New Companies Act Unlocked (2011) 338. 
21
 Matsaneng op cit note 9 at 84-85; Cassim and Yeats op cit note 9 at 731. 
22
 Weinberg and Blank op cit note 9 at 3. 
23
 Ibid at 4. 
24











controlled by it, irrespective of whether such holding or holdings confer de facto 
control. 25 
 
The definition in the Regulations is similar but marginally wider.26 It provides that 
‘control’ means ‘the holding of a beneficial interest in a regulated company equal to or 
exceeding the specified percentage of voting rights in that regulated company’.27 The 
definition is wider as ‘beneficial interest’28 encapsulates not only voting rights but also 
the right to participate in distribution and to dispose of any part of a security.29 The 
specified percentage referred to above may be set by the Minister of Trade and Industry 
and may not exceed 35 per cent.30 It is currently set at 35 per cent.31  
 
It is averred that the prescribed percentage was set at 35 per cent to cater for broad-
based black economic empowerment (hereinafter referred to as ‘BBBEE’) consortiums 
as they generally own one third of companies, and the 35 per cent threshold ensures 
that the mandatory offer is not triggered.32 A mandatory offer is triggered where a 
person or persons acting in concert, after an acquisition, can exercise more than the 
prescribed voting securities in the target company.33 That person or persons must offer 
to acquire the remainder of the securities of that company on the same terms.34 
Mandatory offers are triggered at 30 per cent in the UK.35 The concept of a mandatory 
offer does not exist in the US and Australia.36 
 
                                                           
25
 Section 440A(1). 
26
 The Companies Regulations, 2011 were published on 26 April 2011 GN R.351, GG 34239. Section 120 provides 
that the Minister is to publish regulations to give effect to part B and part C of the Act, these are the Takeover 
Regulations. 
27
 Regulation 81(e). 
28
 Section 1. 
29
 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s440A(1); Companies Act 71 of 2008 s1. 
30




 Boardman op cit note 13 at 324. 
33
 Section 123(2). 
34
 Section 123(4). 
35
 Boardman op cit note 13 at 324. 
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There has been criticism that the 35 per cent threshold hampers the advancement of 
previously disadvantaged persons.37 It is simply too costly for BBBEE constituencies to 
acquire majority control in companies by exceeding the 35 per cent threshold and thus 
triggering the mandatory offer.38 There have been submissions that legislation should 
take heed of this and exempt BBBEE consortiums from compliance with takeover 
laws.39 The threshold becomes more of a concern when one considers that a certain 
entity may be part of a consortium of BBBEE companies and that when one of the 
entities in the consortium makes an offer it would qualify as ‘acting in concert’ and as a 
result each entity in the consortium will be forced to make a mandatory offer.40 
 
Previously, the mandatory offer would be triggered, not only when the 35 per cent was 
reached but also at increments of 5 per cent up to 50 per cent,41 in other words, if a 
person with 35 per cent went from 35 per cent to 40 per cent, 40 per cent to 45 per cent 
or 45 per cent to 50 per cent it would trigger the mandatory offer but not if the offeror 
has more than 50 per cent.42 This was referred to as the ‘creep provisions’ under the 
1973 Act and has since been abolished.43   
 
The Difference between Hostile and Friendly Takeovers 
The Takeover Regulations do not explicitly provide for two types of takeovers, but it is 
evident from the provisions that there are two types of takeovers that can take place, 
namely, a friendly and a hostile takeover. 44  
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 Mpheane Abiot Lepaku ‘Mandatory Offer and BEE’ (2005) 13 The Quarterly Law Review for People in Business 








 Securities Regulation Code on Takeovers and Mergers Rule 8.1. 
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 Lepaku op cit note 37 at 171. 
43
 Stein op cit note 20 at 23; Boardman op cit note 13 at 323. 
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A friendly takeover can also be referred to as a negotiated takeover.45 It is where the 
acquirer has approached the board of the target company prior to making the formal bid 
to the shareholders of the said company.46 The board then agrees to the offer made by 
the acquirer and either recommends it to the shareholders or remains neutral.47 In 
practice this occurs by the acquirer and the target board jointly communicating with the 
target shareholders by issuing combined circulars.48 
 
A hostile takeover can also be referred to as an un-negotiated takeover.49 This is where 
the acquirer has approached the target board, the board opposes the bid and advises 
the shareholders to reject the offer.50 Despite this, the acquirer seeks to takeover the 
company on the terms and conditions rejected by the target board or the acquirer 
bypasses the target board (not seeking their approval at all)51 and makes a bid directly 
to the shareholders of the target company.52 For this reason hostile takeovers have 
been described as ‘legally graceless’.53 In practice they usually occur by means of the 
acquirer and the target board communicating separately with the target shareholders, 
and if necessary, the shareholders of the acquiring company.54  
 
The board may be opposing the offer with the intention of genuinely defending against 
the takeover as they believe it not to be in the best interests of the company and its 
shareholders.55 However, the board may simply be rejecting it with the sole purpose of 
                                                           
45
 Matsaneng op cit note 9 at 88. 
46
  Levitt and Bee op cit note 6 at 41. 
47
 Weinberg and Blank op cit note 9 at 7. 
48
 Stein op cit note 20 at 338. 
49
 Matsaneng op cit note 9 at 87. 
50
 Weinberg and Blank op cit note 9 at 7. 
51
 Matsaneng op cit note 9 at 87. 
52
 Levitt and Bee op cit note 6 at 41. 
53
 ME Matsaneng ‘Corporate Control Transactions in the United States of America’ (2010) Transactions of the 
Centre for Business Law: The Role and Consequences of Pure Corporate Control and Corporate Social 
Responsibility in South Africa and the United States 132 at 145. 
54
 Stein op cit note 20 at 338. 
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negotiating a better price for the shareholders, which is often the case in the US.56 A 
‘bidding war’ may also arise either on the invitation of the target board or as a result of 
the offer going public.57 
 
Directors and managers tend to oppose these bids because they involve inherent 
risks.58 In a hostile bid the acquirer will not be able to undertake a complete due 
diligence of the target company and as a result financial institutions will be reluctant to 
finance the takeover bid as the extent of the liabilities of the target company are 
unknown.59 Regardless of whether it is a hostile or friendly takeover, for some reason 
the transaction costs involved in a takeover are often overlooked, including, financing 
fees, investment advisory fees and legal fees.60 Hostile takeovers are an especially 
expensive business, even more so in jurisdictions where the target board can employ 
defensive mechanisms to ward off a hostile bid.61 However, when a target board 
employs these defensive mechanisms it is often to negotiate a better deal for the 
shareholders of the target board.62 As a result, a hostile bid may be more beneficial to 
the shareholders but not to the target company.63  The rationale for the assertion that 
defensive mechanisms yield better prices for shareholders is simply that if a first offer by 
a bidder does not succeed then the second offer will logically have to be higher.64 In 
other words, the very fact that shareholders often benefit from management’s resistance 
serves to justify resistance itself.65 
 






 Nickig op cit note 5 at 23.  
59
 Levitt and Bee op cit note 6 at 41. 
60
 Alan R. Palmiter Corporations: Explanations and Examples 6ed (2009) 664. 
61






 Christian Kley Defensive Tactics Against Takeovers in Theory and Practice in the USA, the UK, South Africa, 













In a successful takeover a shareholder should receive a premium price for their 
shares.66 It therefore seemingly benefits the shareholders but does not take into 
consideration that during a hostile takeover shareholders are generally pressured to sell 
their shares.67 It is averred that hostile takeovers have a negative long term effect on 
the productivity and returns of the target company.68 Empirical findings are not 
convincing in this regard.69 Part of the reason is due to the various methods which are 
used to collect and analyse data.70  
 
Summary 
The definition of ‘control’ is the key to takeovers as once that change in control occurs it 
triggers a takeover.71 It is evident from the discussion above that the decision to 
undergo a hostile takeover from the acquirer’s perspective is risky and the decision to 
take defensive action on the part of the target company must be well thought out.72  
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 Martin Lipton ‘Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom’ (1979) Business Lawyer 101 at 110. 
69
 John C. Coates IV ‘Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence’ (2000) 79 
Texas Law Review 271 at 317 as cited by Jordan M. Barry, John William Hatfield ‘Pills and Partisans: 
Understanding Takeover Defenses’ (2012) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 633 at footnote 6, which deals 
with empirical findings in the context of using the poison pill. For a discussion of the inconclusive nature of 
empirical evidence regarding mergers and acquisitions in Nigeria, see Olowoniyi Adeyemi Olusola and Ojenike 
Joseph O ‘Mergers and Performance of Conglomerates Companies in Nigeria’ Vol 3 (2012) Journal of Emerging 
Trends in Economics and Management Sciences (JETEMS) 393 at 395. Regarding the uncertainty on the effect on 
shareholders post hostile takeover, see Simon Deakin ‘Corporate Governance, Finance and Growth: Unraveling the 
Relationship’ (2010) Acta Juridica: Modern Company Law for a Competitive South African Economy 191 at 201. 
For varied evidence regarding the effect on profitability, see A Cosh and A Hughes ‘Takeovers after “Takeovers” ’ 
CBR Working Paper No 636, June 2008 as cited by Simon Deakin ‘Corporate Governance, Finance and Growth: 
Unraveling the Relationship’ (2010) Acta Juridica: Modern Company Law for A Competitive South African 
Economy at footnote 46. 
70
 Kley op cit note 64 at 19. 
71
 Matsaneng op cit note 9 at 84-85; Cassim and Yeats op cit note 9 at 731; Regulation 81(e). 
72
 Weinberg and Blank op cit note 9 at 8; Nickig op cit note 5 at 23; Levitt and Bee op cit note 6 at 41; Palmiter op 











Chapter 2: The Operation, Effect and Rationale of a Takeover 
In this chapter I will discuss how a takeover comes about.73  I will then explain that a 
takeover can result in one of three types of acquisitions.74 It can also be a hybrid but this 
is unusual.75 Finally, I will delve into the theories that underlie takeovers, most of which 
are rooted in law and economics.76 
 
Operation of a Takeover 
The takeover is usually motivated by a bidder making an offer to acquire a controlling 
block of shares in another company, referred to as the target company.77 A bidder is 
also known as an acquirer or an offeror and is often described as a ‘corporate raider’ in 
the US if the offer is a hostile one.78 If sufficient shareholders ‘tender’ or accept the 
offer, the bidder will acquire control of the target company.79 However, the board of the 
target company may reject the offer made by the acquirer and a takeover battle may 
ensue.80  
 
Effect of a Takeover 
The result of a takeover transaction can be categorized as a horizontal, vertical or 
conglomerate acquisition.81 A horizontal acquisition is between companies in the same 
industry in that they produce the same products or services.82 This form is most often 
                                                           
73
 Steven C. Bradford ‘Stampeding Shareholders and Other Myths: Target Shareholders and Hostile Tender Offers’ 
(1990) The Journal of Corporation Law (1990) 417 at 417; Matsaneng op cit note 53 at 145; Kley op cit note 64 at 
1-2. 
74
 Weinberg and Blank op cit note 9 at 5; Olusola and Joseph op cit note 69 at 395. 
75
 Weinberg and Blank op cit note 9 at 6. 
76
 Andreas Cahn and David C. Donald Comparative Company Law Text and Cases on the Laws Governing 
Corporations in Germany, the UK and the USA (2010) 795. 
77
 Bradford op cit note 73 at 417. 
78
 Ibid; Matsaneng op cit note 53 at 145. 
79
 Bradford op cit note 73 at 417; Kley op cit note 64 at 1-2; Matsaneng op cit note 53 at 145. 
80
 Kley op cit note 64 at 1-2. 
81













used by companies competing with each other.83 As it reduces competition it may be a 
cause for concern in the arena of competition law. 84  
 
A vertical acquisition ‘expand[s] backward or forward in the chain of distribution, towards 
the source of raw materials or towards the ultimate consumers’.85 In other words, 
instances where either of the two companies ‘is an actual or potential supplier of goods 
or services to the other, so that the two companies are both engaged in the 
manufacture or provision of the same goods or services but at different stages in the 
supply route’.86 The purpose is to secure either a supply or an outlet for services or 
products.87 A conglomerate is between hosts of unrelated companies, in other words, 
companies in different industries.88 
 
Rationale for Takeovers 
The dominant theory supporting the takeover mechanism is called the ‘efficient capital 
market theory’.89 It provides that the share price indicates the sum total value of the 
company.90 Ultimately, if a company has a low share price this is equated with bad 
management and the company is susceptible to a takeover.91 The possibility of a 
takeover, on the one hand, serves a monitoring and encouragement function for the 
board.92 On the other hand, it may be detrimental, as will be discussed later on.93 
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 Olusola and Joseph op cit note 69 at 395. 
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 Olusola and Joseph op cit note 69 at 395; Weinberg and Blank op cit note 9 at 6. 
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 Frank H Easterbrook and Daniel R Fischel ‘The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a 




 AL Christison and RC Williams ‘The Harmony – Gold Fields Take-over Battle’ (2008) 125 SALJ 790 at 793. 
92
 Kley op cit note 64 at 6. 
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If a shareholder is dissatisfied with the management of the company, that shareholder 
may sell his or her shares.94 When a shareholder does this it may lower the price of the 
shares and in effect make it easier and more attractive for a potential acquirer to 
takeover the company.95 Easier, because an acquirer will then offer a seemingly large 
sum for the shares and as a result shareholders will be more likely to sell.96 More 
attractive, because the acquirer believes that the assets of the company are 
undervalued as the share price of the target company does not necessarily reflect the 
true value of the assets of the company.97 The sum that the acquirer will offer will 
usually be above the market price of the shares but below what it believes the true 
value to be.98 
 
When a company has a low share price in relation to its potential value, the company is 
deemed to be underperforming and will then find itself vulnerable to a takeover.99 The 
larger the gap the greater the chance of a takeover and the more bidders will be waiting 
to make a move.100 The under-performance gives the impression that a company is not 
being efficiently managed and that the new owners could maximize the value of the 
company by managing it better if taken over.101 This is based on the efficient capital 
market theory which provides that ‘the price of a share embodies all of the available 
information about the value of the shares’,102 and therefore it will be evident in the price 
of the share if a company is being mismanaged.103 This theory is based on market 
efficiency.104 
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 H G Manne ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control’ (1965) 73 Journal of Political Economy 110 at 112-




 W. Stewart Robinson ‘A Change in the Legal Wind – How a New Direction for Corporate Governance Could 
Affect Takeover Regulation’ (2012) International Company and Commercial Law Review 292 at 293. 
97
 Weinberg and Blank op cit note 9 at 25; Robinson op cit note 96 at 293. 
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 Weinberg and Blank op cit note 9 at 26-27. 
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 Matsaneng op cit note 53 at 145. 
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 Easterbrook and Fischel op cit note 89 at 1165. 
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 Kley op cit note 64 at 5-6. 
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The acquirers could manage it better by removing managers, stripping assets or closing 
unprofitable business ventures.105 The right of an acquirer to approach the shareholders 
and convince them of this is an inherent part of a free enterprise economy.106 The hope 
is that the company would increase in value and the acquirer would not only have made 
a profit but also benefit the community and employees of the target company by 
maximizing the potential of the business.107 
 
The possibility of being taken over serves as encouragement or as i centive to boards 
to constantly and consistently perform to their full potential.108 It is thus perceived as a 
monitoring function.109 There is a fear on the part of directors because generally 
managers are ousted when a company is taken over.110 Theoretically this awareness 
creates competition which in turn is good for business.111 The danger of this is that the 
board may make decisions based on short term financial returns and the current share 
price in order that shareholders may be satisfied and therefore not vote in favour of a 
takeover.112  
 
The other view is that takeovers are detrimental to the optimum functioning of the 
economy in its entirety.113 This perspective focuses on socio-economic considerations 
such as retrenchment, shutting down of the company, effects on the community as they 
lose their core employer and the relationships between target companies and their 
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 JR Wiblin ‘A Mandatory Takeover Offer – Too High a Price for the Economy to Pay?’ Journal for Juridical 
Science (2004) 173 at 176. 
106
 Weinberg and Blank op cit note 9 at 11. 
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 Deakin op cit note 69 at 195; K. Keasey, S. Thompson and M. Wright ‘Completing Diagnoses and Solutions’ in 
Corporate Governance: Economic, Management and Financial Issues (1997) 5 as cited by Robinson op cit note 96 
at footnote 35. 
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customers and/ or suppliers.114 One needs to bear in mind that a company in a tight 
spot may need to implement structural changes in any event in order to save their 
business.115 There are also arguments that the threat of a takeover defeats effective 
long term planning116 and instead emphasises short term gain.117 Long term planning is 
defeated because stakeholders plan to protect themselves in case the company is 
taken over.118 These stakeholders include shareholders, employees, customers, 
suppliers and the community at large.119  
 
Summary 
The efficient capital market theory provides a well-reasoned rationale for takeovers and 
it is submitted that it follows naturally that an acquirer would want to takeover a 
company for less than it is actually worth.120 This rationale will have an impact on the 
debate around who should have the power to make decisions regarding frustrating 
action.121 
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Chapter 3: Regulatory Regime 
In this chapter I will discuss the concept of frustrating action in South Africa. I will 
explore what it is, when the prohibition is triggered and the role of the TRP in regulating 
it. 
 
Purpose of Code 
The main purpose of changing the takeover regime under the 2008 Act was to 
undertake an assessment of the role of the Securities Regulation Panel (‘the SRP’) and 
to consider the ambit of the terms ‘fundamental transaction’ and ‘affected 
transaction’.122 
 
The 1973 Act established the SRP and it regulated affected transactions through the 
Securities Regulation Code on Takeovers and Mergers.123 The Code was based on the 
City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, (‘the UK City Code’) which was at the time 
observed voluntarily and referred to as ‘quasi-legal’.124 Under the 1973 Act the Code did 
not have legislative status.125 
 
The 2008 Act has replaced the SRP with the TRP which is the regulatory institution 
established in terms of s196(1).126 Its main purpose is to regulate affected 
transactions.127  The takeover provisions are contained in Part B and Part C of Chapter 
                                                           
122
 Tshepho H Mongalo ‘An Overview of Company Law Reform in South Africa: From the Guidelines to the 
Companies Act 2008’ (2010) Acta Juridica: Modern Company Law for a Competitive South African Economy 13 at 
18. 
123
 Stephanie M Luiz ‘Enforcement of the Securities Regulation Code and the Role of the Courts’ (2006) 27 Obiter 
49 at 49. 
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 Wiblin op cit note 105 at 177-178. 
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5 of the Act and in the Takeover Regulations which are in Chapter 5.128 The 
Regulations, as issued by the Minister of Trade and Industry, have the status of 
delegated legislation and is therefore subordinate to the Act.129 This is a fundamental 
change as the authority of the SRP was questioned under the old regime because it had 
no express power provided to it in terms of the 1973 Act.130 
 
Section 119(1) sets out the objects of the TRP in regulating affected transactions and 
s119(2) promotes the objects.131  These are materially similar to the general principles 
provided in the SRP Code.132 The fundamental difference is that the general principles 
were for purposes of guidance and not legally enforceable.133 The objects of the Panel 
is to regulate transactions: 
 
without regard to the commercial advantages or disadvantages of any 
transaction or proposed transaction, in order to- 
 
(a) ensure the integrity of the marketplace and fairness to the holders of securities of 
regulated companies 
(b) ensure the provision of- 
 
(i) necessary information to holders of securities of regulated companies, to 
the extent required to facilitate the making of fair and informed decisions; 
and 
(ii) adequate time for regulated companies and holders of their securities to 
obtain and provide advice with respect to offers; and 
                                                           
128
 Cassim and Yeats op cit note 9 at 741. 
129
 Davis, Cassim and Geach op cit note 125 at 207; Christina Pretorius and Isla Swart ‘Mandatory Offers’ 
(November 2011) Without Prejudice 25 at 25. 
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(c) prevent actions by a regulated company designed to impede, frustrate, or defeat 
an offer, or the making of fair and informed decisions by the holders of that 
company’s securities.134 
 
Section 119(2) provides that the objects must be given effect to by ensuring that 
security holders of the same class are treated equally and that all relevant information 
must be provided to them.135 Practically, it also provides that a person must not enter 
into an affected transaction unless they can and are intending to implement it.136 
 
Scope of the Takeover Regulation Panel 
The TRP has jurisdiction over all affected transactions involving ‘regulated 
companies’137 unless the Panel has granted an exemption.138 If no exemption is 
granted, a transaction cannot be implemented unless the Panel has issued a 
compliance notice.139 The Panel has jurisdiction where the transaction will result in a 
change of the holders of the securities.140  There are no guidelines provided as to how 
the TRP is to make a decision141 and the legislature did not make provision for time 
limits.142 The only standard that the TRP then has to meet is the objects of the Takeover 
Regulations.143  
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One of the aims of the TRP, as set out in s119, is to regulate transactions or proposed 
transactions in such a manner that ‘prevent(s) actions by a regulated company 
designed to impede, frustrate, or defeat an offer, or the making of fair and informed 
decisions by the holders of that company’s securities’.144 The term ‘frustrating action’ is 
therefore not expressly defined in the legislation but it finds expression in the objects.145 
 
Section 126 was designed to achieve the objective set out in s119.146 It regulates the 
actions of the board once an offer is imminent or has been received by the regulated 
company.147 In terms of the Act an offer is ‘imminent’ when a potential offeror has 
entered into consensual negotiations with a regulated company.148 An offer is therefore 
not imminent if it is the subject of rumour or speculation but a firm intention has not 
been made and if a regulated company has not entered into consensual negotiations 
with a potential offeror.149 An offer has been ‘received’ first when a mandatory offer is 
required and second when the bidder has communicated a firm intention to make an 
offer such as a formal written offer150 and is in fact in a position to proceed.151 
Confidentiality during consensual negotiations is crucial and as a result this is dealt with 
in reg 94.152 
 
Section 126 is therefore only triggered if a company receives a bona fide offer or 
believes such an offer may be imminent.153 It consists of a ‘catch-all’154 clause and 
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specific prohibited actions.155  The ‘catch-all’ clause provides that once an offer is 
imminent or has been received, the board of the regulated company may not take any 
action that could result in a bona fide offer being frustrated or the holders of the relevant 
securities being denied the opportunity to decide that offer on its merits.156 The board 
must genuinely believe that there will be an offer and they must have reasonable 
grounds for this belief.157  
 
Even if the frustration provisions did not contain the ‘catch-all’ phrase, it is submitted 
that any transaction or agreement which defeated the effect of the frustration provisions 
would come under scrutiny as it frustrates or denies the holders of securities an 
opportunity to decide the offer on its merits.158 This is due to the anti-avoidance 
provisions found in s6.159 The provisions in s6 apply generally to all transactions and 
actions governed by the Act and specifically states that, any transaction or agreement, 
which results in the effect of a prohibition being reduced or defeated, may be declared 
void to that extent.160 Although the section has not yet been interpreted by our courts, 
any transaction avoiding the outcomes of the Act in the manner described above would 
be a likely candidate to which the section might apply.161 The catch-all phrase is 
however commendable in that it does provide legal certainty.162 
 
The duty imposed by the frustration provisions is two-fold.163 There is the positive duty 
to inform shareholders of the offer and the negative duty not to frustrate the bid.164 
Flowing from the positive duty to inform shareholders is the fact that directors are 
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permitted to offer advice or make recommendations and provide the information on 
which the recommendation or advice is based.165  This is to safeguard against 
shareholders selling their shares at an undervalue.166 The negative duty not to frustrate 
a bid flows from the fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the company.167 It has 
been held that it is a breach of this duty to prevent shareholders from deciding on the 
merits of the offer whether they would like to accept or reject the bid.168  
 
In terms of section 126(1) there is a list of actions which the board may not take unless: 
1. they have received prior written approval from the TRP and the approval of the 
relevant security holders; or- 
2. the action is in terms of a pre-existing obligation or agreement which was entered 
into before the board received the offer or before they bona fide believed that an 
offer was imminent. 169 
 
If the board does however believe that the prospective action is subject to a pre-existing 
obligation then it may apply to the TRP for consent to proceed with the relevant 
action.170 The word ‘may’ is not peremptory but rather directory and connotes an option 
on the part of the company to apply to the TRP or not.171 As a result a company does 
not have an obligation to apply to the TRP but it is envisaged that a regulated company 
would instead ere on the side of caution when uncertain of a particular action which is 
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opposed to a listed prohibited action.172 The list of specific prohibited actions is that the 
board may not: 
 
(b) issue any authorized but unissued shares; 
(c) issue or grant options in respect of any unissued securities; 
(d) authorize or issue, or permit the authorization or issue of, any securities carrying 
rights of conversion into or subscription for other securities; 
(e) sell, dispose of or acquire, or agree to sell, dispose of or acquire, assets of a 
material amount except in the ordinary course of business; 
(f) enter into contracts otherwise than in the ordinary course of business; or 
(g) make a distribution that is abnormal as to timing and amount.173 
 
The provisions are materially similar to that of the UK City Code.174 In the US, on the 
other hand, a target board may implement defensive mechanisms during a hostile 
takeover bid.175 Australia finds itself somewhat in the middle of these two jurisdictions 
as frustrating action is not prohibited but it is frowned upon.176 I will discuss these 
jurisdictions in greater detail below.177 Under the old regime, the only defensive action 
that was permitted in South Africa was the creation of preference stock.178 
 
The noteworthy difference between the Code and Regulations is that under the old 
regime the prohibited action required either shareholder approval or the approval of the 
SRP, not approval from both.179 Under the Regulations the type of approval (special 
resolution or an ordinary resolution) required from the relevant security holders depends 
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on the type of transaction.180 This new double approval is consistent with the stated 
objectives of the Department of Trade and Industry for enhanced transparency.181 It 
provides the holders of securities, particularly minority shareholders, with additional 
protection.182 
 
Definition of ‘Affected Transaction’ 
Affected transactions can broadly be categorized into two branches.183 First, all 
fundamental transactions are affected transactions if one of the companies is a 
regulated company.184 Fundamental transactions are a disposal of all or a greater part 
of the assets or undertaking,185 an amalgamation or merger186 and a scheme of 
arrangement.187 The Takeover Regulations will not apply if the transaction is effected in 
terms of a Business Rescue plan.188 
 
Second, the ‘acquisition of a prescribed percentage’189 of voting securities will trigger 
the takeover provisions.190 These are for example a mandatory offer and a compulsory 
acquisition.191  As previously explained, a mandatory offer is triggered when a person or 
persons acting in concert, after an acquisition, can exercise more than the prescribed 
voting securities in the target company.192 In these instances that person or persons 
must offer to acquire the remainder of the securities of that company on the same 
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terms.193 A compulsory acquisition occurs where more than 90 per cent of the holders of 
a certain class of securities, has accepted the offer, and requires the offeror to make an 
offer to the remaining security holders of that class.194  
 
The ambit of the definition of ‘affected transaction’ has been significantly broadened.195 
In essence it covers more transactions and as a result offers more transparency and 
protection.196 It is therefore a considerable improvement.197 In terms of the 1973 Act, an 
affected transaction was either a disposal or an acquisition which resulted in a person or 
persons who did not have control prior to the transaction now possessing such control 
or a person or persons acting in concert becoming the sole shareholder.198 This 
acquisition would then trigger a mandatory offer.199 It is interesting to note that the 
provision would also apply to an acquisition or announced intention to acquire a 
beneficial interest in a regulated company which results in an acquisition or disposal of 
a beneficial interest of a multiple of 5 per cent, ie 5 per cent, 10 per cent, 15 per cent 
and so forth.200 
 
The purpose of widening the net emanates from the provisions which provide that once 
a person makes an acquisition or disposal that results in the aforementioned, such 
person must notify the regulated company, who must in turn notify the TRP and the 
security holders.201 Ultimately the provisions necessitate nothing more than regular 
disclosure to ensure that security holders are aware of the activity of the company and 
to ensure that the TRP can monitor activity as well so as to ensure that no takeover is 
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effected unnoticed.202 As previously mentioned, the ‘creep provisions’ have been 
abolished.203 
 
Affected transactions are used as tools to attain corporate control.204  Companies thrive 
off this market and without it cannot function optimally.205 The market for corporate 
control finds expression primarily via hostile takeover bids.206 The concept of ‘the 
market for corporate control’ is referring to the contest between the managers or boards 
of companies and potential bidders competing for the position of managing the 
resources of a company.207 This is often the case where the current resources of the 
company are not being used to their full potential.208 In an active market there is likely 
be a contest for this company’s resources.209  
 
Definition of ‘Regulated Company’ 
As mentioned, the transactions are only considered to be ‘affected transactions’ where 
they involve so-called regulated companies.210 A regulated company is in turn defined 
as all public and state-owned companies unless the latter has been exempted in terms 
of the Act, and private companies in limited instances.211 Private companies are 
included in terms of the Regulations if more than 10 per cent of the private company’s 
shares have been transferred to unrelated persons during the 24 months preceding the 
transaction or offer.212 A private company is also treated as a ‘regulated company’ on a 
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voluntary basis in cases where the Memorandum of Incorporation of the company 
expressly provides for the application of the Takeover Regulations and parts B and C of 
the Act.213 The 1973 Act similarly applied to public companies, state-owned companies 
and private companies.214 Private companies had to have a certain number of beneficial 
shareholders and their interest had to be above a prescribed amount.215 The possibility 
existed for private companies to be excluded.216 
 
The Relationship between the Companies Act and the Competition Act217 
The Competition Act218 regulates takeovers when a transaction is over a certain size 
and if it poses a threat to competition in the relevant market.219 The Competition Act and 
the Companies Act have diverging interests in that competition law is concerned with 
the ‘promotion and protection of competition between firms’220 and company law is 
concerned with the best interests of the company, including the interests of minority 
shareholders and the mechanism to ensure a transparent and procedurally sound 
transaction process.221 I will not deal exhaustively with the Competition Act as this falls 
outside the scope of this paper. 
 
Summary 
The regulation of the frustration provisions in legislation provides for legal certainty.222 
There is increased protection as the definition of ‘affected transaction’ has been 
widened.223 The prohibition is stricter under the new regime as there is a double 
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approval required in order for the board to be able to take frustrating action.224 The 
threshold of approval by security holders is dependent on the type of transaction.225 
There is no express definition of ‘frustrating action’ in the Act or Regulations.226 It is 
submitted that the regime may have benefited from a definition as it provides further 
certainty.227 There are no guidelines for the TRP to follow in order to make a decision 
and there is also no time limit within which the TRP has to operate.228 It is submitted 
that this is a grave oversight on the part of the legislature as the failure to provide 
guidelines gives the TRP too wide a discretion and the failure to provide time limits 
means there is no mechanism to deal with delays.229  
 
                                                           
224
 Stein op cit note 20 at 333; Securities Regulations Panel, rule 19. 
225
 Delport op cit note 7 at 441. 
226
 As mentioned at 18. 
227
 Saulsbury op cit note 10 at 125. 
228
 Companies Regulations Part E reg 116-122; Companies Act Part B s117-120. 
229
 Leo E Strine, Jr. ‘Delaware's Corporate-Law System: Is Corporate America Buying an Exquisite Jewel or a 
Diamond in the Rough? A Response to Kahan & Kamar's Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law’ 86 
(2001) Cornell Law Review 1257 at 1263 as cited by Saulsbury op cit note 10 at footnote 89; Companies 
Regulations Part E Reg 116-122; Companies Act Part B Section 117-120; Armour and Skeel op cit note 142 at 












Chapter 4: Who Should Make the Decision to Take Frustrating Action?  
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss which company organ is better placed to make 
a decision regarding frustrating action.230 There is some debate around which company 
organ is best equipped.231 The decision to take frustrating action can either be taken by 
the board or by relevant security holders.232 I will discuss the diverging views and its 
rationale.233 
 
The shareholder primacy model ascribed to may impact how the board makes this 
decision.234 It determines what factors the board takes into account when making 
decisions and how this will affect whether the board is best set to make a decision.235 
Shareholder activism and the different types of shareholders also play a role in this 
debate as it explores how involved a shareholder is in the company.236 It will also be 
shown that there are different types of shareholders and that depending on the type the 
shareholder will either have tendency to be active or apathetic.237 At the end of the 
chapter I will discuss the South African position regarding matters mentioned above. 
 
Diverging Views 
Shareholders exercise indirect control over a company by exercising their voting power 
through their shares, which makes them the owners of the company.238 Directors are 
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directly in control of a company as its managers.239 There are two schools of thought in 
the US regarding the debate around who should make a decision to take frustrating 
action to defend against a hostile takeover.240  The two proponents of these schools of 
thought are Martin Lipton and Joseph Flom.241 Lipton was concerned with the interests 
of the directors.242  He was the creator of the poison pill, which is the most widely used 
defensive mechanism in the US.243 Flom was pro-shareholder and thus believed that 
the decision to take defensive action should lay with the shareholders.244  
 
Rationale Why Shareholder Should Decide 
Historically, in South Africa, shareholders decide whether any action can be taken to 
frustrate a hostile takeover.245 The rationale is that the shareholders should be able to 
make a decision as owners of the company regarding their shares and the future of the 
company therefore the board should not take from them the opportunity to make a 
decision.246 Also, as owners, they are entitled to make decisions that are in their best 
interests, and not necessarily in the best interests of the company.247 Generally, 
shareholders look to maximize the value of their shareholding with reasonable risk-
taking.248 This is similar to the position in the UK where the shareholders ultimately 
decide.249 The legislation provides that the board must not usurp the discretion of the 
shareholders as owners to decide whether or not to seize an opportunity.250 This 
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buttresses the fundamental principle that the shares of listed companies should be 
freely transferable.251 
 
The main argument against allowing directors to decide is that there is the potential of a 
conflict of interest.252 Directors are cautious about hostile takeovers as their jobs could 
literally depend on them defeating the takeover, and so they often desperately seek to 
entrench themselves.253 For this reason there is a fear that the board may not act in the 
best interests of the shareholders and they may reject an offer because they look to 
entrench their positions.254 They may also accept an offer either because they want to 
remain on the board under the acquirer, or due to the fact that a considerable 
severance package or ‘golden handshake’ might be on offer should they co-operate 
with the bidder.255 These ‘golden handshakes’ or ‘golden parachutes’ could be in the 
form of, for example, share options or severanc  packages.256 The issue of 
entrenchment may become more problematic where directors own shares in the 
company.257 The directors must however act only in the best interests of the company 
and must not have regard to their personal shareholdings.258 
 
Rationale Why Board Should Decide  
In the US the board has a wide discretion when responding to a hostile takeover bid. 259 
Despite the fact that the decision whether or not to accept the actual offer lies with the 
shareholders, the board has the power to implement a wide range of defensive 
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mechanisms that will frustrate a bid. 260 The rationale is that the board manages the 
company and as such they are in a better position than the shareholders to make a 
decision on the merits of the offer.261 Directors are familiar with the business and have 
access to all the relevant information.262 As shareholders are not as knowledgeable it 
may in fact be to their disadvantage to allow them to make a final decision.263 It follows 
that the board can then protect the company (and as a result the shareholders).264 This 
is clearly a ‘board centric’ approach in comparison to South Africa which is more 
‘shareholder-centric’.265 The ultimate decision lies with the shareholder and the board 
lacks any real power to respond to a takeover bid.266   
 
It can be worrisome to a board being threatened with a hostile takeover to accept that 
shareholders do not owe a fiduciary duty to the company therefore unlike the directors 
they do not have to act in the best interests of the company.267 As they own shares they 
are free to exercise the rights in terms of those shares as they so please.268 This is 
understandable as shareholders are investors in the company and as such should not 
be saddled with fiduciary duties269. There are exceptions in this regard, that is, directors 
who are shareholders, the role of majority shareholders to protect the minority and 
shareholders in small companies like partnerships who owe one another a duty of good 
faith.270   
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The main issue with shareholders making the decision regarding defensive action is that 
shareholders have differing interests.271 Also, shares change hands all the time.272 A 
study which reflects this revealed that the holding period of shares have decreased 
significantly over the last 50 years from an average of six to eight years to between 
seven months and one year.273 On top of this, short-term and long-term shareholders 
have different ‘economic incentives’.274 In light of this it becomes even more crucial for 
directors when fulfilling their fiduciary duties to act in accordance with what is in the best 
interests of the company in its entirety and not necessarily what will yield the highest 
returns for shareholders.275  
 
Shareholder Primacy 
How much importance a director places on the interest of shareholders will depend by 
and large on the approach which a specific jurisdiction subscribes to.276  
 
The UK the enlightened shareholder value approach.277 This approach acknowledges 
that a company has many stakeholders but that their interests are subordinate to those 
of the shareholders and only when it is in the best interests of the company should the 
interests of the other stakeholders be considered.278 Therefore when there is a conflict 
of interest the shareholders interests should prevail.279 The concept of ‘corporate 
constituency’ is practiced within US takeover law; this is where stakeholder interests are 
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considered.280 Therefore constituencies other than shareholders such as employees, 
suppliers, customers and the community within which the business operates are taken 
into account when making a decision.281 In South Africa, King III emphasizes a 
stakeholder-inclusive approach.282 This recognizes that a company has many 
stakeholders which influence it and that when making decisions the board should take 
into consideration the legitimate interests and expectations of all of its stakeholders and 
balance these in the best interests of the company.283 
 
The difference is that under the enlightened shareholder value approach stakeholders 
are only considered insofar as it is in the interests of the shareholders to do so. The 
stakeholder-inclusive approach includes other stakeholders. Their interests are not 
purely instrumental but rather the interests of all stakeholders, including shareholders, 
are considered insofar as it is in the best interests of the company as a whole to do 
so.284  
 
It warrants mention that the ‘best interests of a company’ is not defined in the Act 
therefore the definition developed by the common law will arguably still apply.285 The 
word ’company’ in this context therefore applies to shareholders as a collective.286 
There are indications that the legislature is pro-stakeholder, however, King III does not 
mean that South African law has conclusively embraced this approach.287 
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Shareholders as the owners of the company by their very nature take significant risks by 
investing in the company.288 However, this may only be the case for the individual 
shareholders who are blockholders and who are keen activists.289 A blockholder refers 
to a shareholder that owns a controlling block of shares.290 Traditionally, shareholders 
would have held shares in one company only and they would look after those shares.291 
In modern company law this is not the case, shareholders now have diverse 
shareholdings.292 Private shareholders are generally less wealthy and less involved in 
the affairs of the company but are instead advised by the press.293 It is difficult to 
encourage shareholders, with minority holdings, that lack sufficient economic incentives, 
to exert resources monitoring management and participating meaningfully in voting by, 
for example, researching the performance of the members of the board and so forth.294 
They become apathetic thereby relinquishing control of the company to the board.295 
 
Institutional Shareholders 
Institutional shareholders are represented by pension funds, insurance companies, unit 
trusts, mutual funds and investment management companies.296 They invest large 
amounts of public savings in various portfolios’ spread over many investments that are 
managed by portfolio managers.297 There has been a steady increase of institutional 
shareholders over the past few decades.298 In South Africa, most shareholders are now 
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institutional.299 The same applies in the UK.300 As will be discussed below, Australia 
mainly has blockholders.301 In the US more than half of the stocks are owned by 
institutional shareholders.302 
 
Institutional shareholders now even have various industry bodies that issue guidelines 
regarding corporate governance issues.303 For example, the Institutional Shareholders’ 
Committee has been established in the UK and issued a Code on the Responsibilities of 
Institutional Investors.304 In South Africa, the King III Committee recommended that a 
Code be drafted; in 2011 it came to fruition in the form of the Code for Responsible 
Investing in South African (‘CRISA’).305  
 
The purpose of an institutional investor is to get the maximum value for its shareholders 
in the least time possible.306  The purpose of an institutional shareholder is therefore 
diametrically opposed to the role of a traditional shareholder; they are investors and by 
their very nature they need to secure the best return on an investment for the benefit of 
their beneficiaries.307 Their motives are purely financially driven.308 However, 
institutional shareholder interests are not monolithic as one may presume.309 They have 
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varying approaches to corporate governance issues.310 Institutional investors diversify 
their portfolios and as expected do not ‘put all their eggs in one basket’.311 Therefore if 
their risk is put into context it is understandable that a loss of a small portfolio would 
hardly impact them.312 
 
Institutional shareholders have the necessary resources and information which enable 
them to be active.313 In theory, their presence on a board reduces the transaction costs 
that an individual shareholder may have to bear.314 However, institutional shareholders 
are not keen activists and they are more likely to sell their shares during a hostile bid 
when offered a premium price and instead invest in another company.315 The individual 
shareholder on the other hand generally invests for long term benefit and is therefore 
less likely to sell.316 
 
Blockholders 
In Australia, so called ‘blockholders’ are especially common.317 They are different to 
institutional shareholders as they are less diversified and thus have more incentive to be 
active.318 There are shared and private benefits which arise from being a blockholder.319 
Shared benefits refer to those benefits that can be enjoyed by other types of 
shareholders.320 Private benefits refer to those benefits that a blockholder enjoys to the 
exclusion of other types of shareholders.321 These private benefits can be to the 
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detriment of minority shareholders.322 The downside of the relationship between 
management and blockholders is that the actions of management are not under close 
scrutiny.323  Provided that the interests of blockholders are being taken care of the 
actions of management will go largely unmonitored.324 As a result block holders are 
generally not keen activists.325 
 
South Africa 
Act provides for Management Powers of the Board 
The 2008 Act explicitly provides that the board manages the company unless the 
Memorandum of Incorporation or the Act provides otherwise.326 The provision is wider 
than the standard clause that one would ordinarily have found in a company’s 
constitution.327 It provides that the director can exercise its powers not only to manage 
the business of the company, which is standard, but also to manage the affairs of the 
company.328 The exact ambit of the ability of the directors to now manage the affairs of 
the company is unknown.329 It could be that directors can now decide that a company 
will apply for liquidation.330 
 
Entrenchment of the Board 
Even though the board manages the company the 2008 Act ‘retains the notion that 
directors serve at the will of the shareholders’.331 This is evinced in the legislation which 
provides that a director can be removed at any time, despite any contrary rule or 










 Section 66(1). 
327
 Sutherland op cit note 3 at 83. 
328
 Ibid; s66(1). 
329















agreement, by an ordinary resolution, at a shareholders meeting.332 This in effect 
prevents directors from entrenching their positions.333 However, the ability to remove a 
director is a weapon that shareholders rarely use.334 
 
Under the 1973 Act directors could easily entrench their positions.335 The fact that 
directors can now easily be removed makes South African companies more vulnerable 
to takeover bids than companies in the US.336 This is due to the fact that when a 
company is taken over in a hostile manner the board is generally replaced, as 
previously discussed.337 In the US they have a staggered board arrangement where 
directors can generally only be removed annually.338  
 
Fiduciary Duties of Directors 
Fiduciary duties are imposed on directors.339 Each director stands in a fiduciary 
relationship to the company.340 The fundamental fiduciary duty is that of a director to act 
in the best interests of the company.341 This essentially dictates that they solely serve 
the company.342 The ‘company’ in this context is widely defined as meaning the 
shareholders as a collective body.343 It is uncertain whether this refers to existing and 
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future shareholders.344 Directors can consider other stakeholders provided the 
shareholders are the ultimate consideration.345 
 
King Report 
The fiduciary duty of a director is also addressed in the King Report.346 King I and II 
both referred to the duty of the directors to consider other stakeholders.347 This duty 
manifests itself in the duty to act in good faith and the duty not to exercise powers for 
collateral purposes.348 The latter duty encompasses the duty of a director to act within 
the powers bestowed.349 A breach of this duty will result in the cancellation of a 
transaction at the election of the company.350 If the company suffers a loss as a result of 
the breach it may claim the extent of the loss from the recalcitrant director.351  
 
Business Judgment Rule: South Africa 
The fiduciary duty of a director to act in the best interests of the company is subject to 
the ‘business judgment rule’.352 This rule deems the actions of a director acceptable if 
the director made the decision based on information that he took reasonable steps to 
obtain, he did not have a personal interest in the decision that he made and if he did 
have a personal interest that he declared it and lastly, he had a genuine belief that the 
decision was in the best interests of the company.353  
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This essentially protects the director from liability for an action that he took which may 
have resulted in the company suffering a loss.354  It includes circumstances where they 
have made errors in judgment, secondary to corporate management, provided the error 
is not due to the director failing to act with loyalty and care.355 This rule has been 
described as a ‘hands-off’ or ‘laissez-faire’ approach as the directors can implement 
defensive tactics at will and their actions are only scrutinized when someone proceeds 
with litigation.356 Some believe that this may reduce the duty of directors and thus 
undermine the shareholders’ rights.357  
 
Summary 
 The two schools provide that either the board or the shareholders can make the 
decision whether to take frustrating action.358 The main rationale as to why the 
shareholders should decide is that the shares are their property and as such they 
should be able to do with it as they please.359  The main argument against shareholders 
deciding is that there is a high turnover of shareholders and that shareholders have 
varying interests.360 As discussed, the type of shareholder will determine how active or 
apathetic the shareholder is.361 
It was submitted that the board should decide as they manage the company and, as 
such, they are involved in the company and have all the information that could possibly 
be relevant to making a decision at their disposal.362 The main argument against the 
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board deciding is that they may be motivated by self-interest.363  However, the fiduciary 
duties of directors can serve as a check and balance.364 The fundamental fiduciary duty 
of a director is to act in the best interests of the company.365 It was submitted that the 
term ‘company’ includes shareholders,366 however, how much weight a director 
attributes to the interests of shareholders depends on the approach to shareholder 
primacy.367 
                                                           
363
 Levitt and Bee op cit note 6 at 41; Cahn and Donald op cit note 76 at 800; Weinberg and Blank op cit note 9 at 
18, 576; Sutherland op cit note 3 at 90-91; Phakeng op cit note 255 at 53. 
364
 This is how it operates in Delaware. The decision of a board of directors to take defensive action is investigated 
in light of the fiduciary duties of a director and as such performs a checking function. This is fully discussed in Part 
II of Chapter 5. See, Saulsbury op cit note 10 at 135-136. 
365
 Sutherland op cit note 3 at 84. 
366
 F Cassim op cit note 285 at 515. 
367
 Sutherland op cit note 3 at 88; R Cassim op cit  note 234 at 496; F Cassim op cit note 234 at 20; du Plessis, 











Chapter 5: International Comparison 
In this chapter I will discuss the regimes applied in the UK, the US and Australia. I will 
focus on how hostile takeovers are regulated and the approach to frustrating action.  
 
I The United Kingdom  
Hostile bids first emerged in the US and Britain during the 1950’s.368 It became evident 
to target boards that they could frustrate a hostile takeover by implementing defensive 
mechanisms.369 A sense developed that company law could not sufficiently protect 
against abuses that may arise when implementing a defensive mechanism therefore the 
city of London endeavoured to self-regulate.370 The first attempt came in the form of the 
‘Notes on Amalgamation of British Businesses of 1959’.371 The Notes were replaced in 
the 1960’s by the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, which is still currently in 
force.372 It has been used by various jurisdictions as a model.373 The City Code and the 
Takeover Panel was introduced as a response to criticism by the press and the UK 
government of the abusive tactics used by acquirers and targets.374 The Notes failed to 
remedy the abuses and it was clear that legislation was necessary.375 
 
The Takeover Code was first drafted in 1968.376 The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers 
came into operation around the same time in order to administer the Code.377 It was not 
legislative therefore compliance was not compulsory.378 The method of ‘cold-
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shouldering’379 was used, where banks and investors would not do business with 
companies that violated or that were thought to have violated the Takeover Code.380 
The Panel also used public censures, requested undertakings from the violating 
company to remedy the breaches and the suspension or withdrawal of a listed company 
from the Stock Exchange.381 This method compelled compliance.382 Defaulters could 
not secure capital and would not be able to access services provided by investment 
banks.383 It was preferred to the force of law for a number of reasons, most notably that 
it was speedy and flexible in the sense that one would not have to have recourse to the 
courts as a tool to interpret the Code.384 This method was used until 2004,385 when the 
European Parliament issued a Takeover Directive.386 The Directive required member 
states to appoint capable authorities to oversee the bidding process and to charge them 
‘with all the powers necessary for the purpose of carrying out their duties, including that 
of ensuring that the parties to a bid comply with the rules made’.387  
 
Member States only had to meet the minimum requirements as set out in the 
Directive.388 It is a flexible piece of legislation.389 This is evinced by the fact that Member 
States can enact additional or stricter standards and provision is made for 
derogations.390 The Takeover Directive was initially implemented in the UK by the 
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Takeovers Directive Regulations, which has since been replaced by Part 28 of the UK 
Companies Act 2006,391 which came into force on 6 April 2007.392 
 
Section 943 of the UK Companies Act provides the Takeover Panel with the necessary 
authority to implement rules relating to any transaction which may have any effect on 
the ownership or control of a company and to make rulings.393 As a result the Code has 
the force of law.394 Regulating takeovers in statute allows for legal certainty, in that there 
is now a means of enforcement.395 It also ensures transparency, as the public is 
involved in the process of passing the statute.396 
 
Common Law Position in the UK  
Defensive mechanisms that would frustrate a takeover bid were strictly prohibited 
except where the target company could prove that the defence was implemented with 
the ‘proper purpose’ of advancing the interests of the company and of the 
shareholders.397 This was referred to as the ‘proper purpose rule’.398 It used the general 
common law duty of a director to exercise his powers for the purpose for which they 
were granted and applied a fiduciary duty analysis in order to determine whether a 
defensive action taken was legitimate.399 It would be legitimate if the dominant purpose 
of the defensive action was to advance the interests of the shareholders and the 
company.400 It would be illegitimate and therefore improper if the dominant purpose was 
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to frustrate the takeover bid.401 The proper purpose rule is codified in the UK 
Companies Act.402  
 
Statutory Position in the UK 
The Takeover Code abrogated the common law position and implemented bright line 
rules where takeover defences are strictly prohibited.403  The ‘non-frustration rule’ is 
contained in general principle 3 and rule 21 which states that frustrating action is 
prohibited once an offer has been received or once it becomes imminent, except with 
shareholder approval.404 This is also known as the ‘passivity rule’ as the board is 
required to remain passive in the face of a hostile takeover bid.405 It is clear that board 
neutrality is one of the core principles introduced by the Code.406 
 
In this regard general principle 3 provides that there is an obligation on the target board 
to act in the interests of the company as a whole and that it should not deny the holders 
of the relevant securities the opportunity to decide an offer on its merits.407 This is 
buttressed by rule 21.1 which provides that when an offer has been received or if the 
target board believes an offer to be imminent, it should not take any action which could 
result in a bona fide offer being frustrated or deny the shareholders an opportunity to 
decide an offer based on its merits.408 Rule 21 further lists specific prohibited actions.409 
These actions are simply examples of prohibited actions but do not limit the effect of 
general principle 3.410 Rule 21 therefore, like South Africa, has a catch-all phrase and 
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thereafter lists specific prohibited actions.411 If there is doubt as to whether a proposed 
action is in terms of a pre-existing obligation or contract, in other words, whether it arose 
prior to the offer being received or imminent, the approval of the Panel is necessary.412  
 
The effect of the Takeover Code is that it places all the power with the shareholders to 
analyse the offer and to decide whether or not to vote in favour of it.413 Therefore if the 
shareholders approve the defensive measure the directors are released from the 
prohibition.414 This reflects that UK company law is shareholder centred.415 
 
Scope of the Takeover Code 
The provisions of the Code apply to all transactions concerned with takeover bids, 
regardless of the means in which the takeover is effected.416 It applies to specific 
companies, broadly speaking these are: 
1. offeree companies over which the UK has jurisdiction in terms of the Directive;417 
2. public companies that has its registered office in the UK;418 and  
3. private companies that have their registered office in the UK, their central 
management is located in the UK and a further condition relating.419 
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Permissible Defensive Action 
It has been argued that despite the passivity rule in the UK there are three defences 
that can be used.420 First, directors use competition law as a means to an end but UK 
legislation has provisions which purpose it is to reduce the possibility of tactical litigation 
used to frustrate a bid.421 Second, the advice given by the target board can criticize the 
offer; this is known as a ‘defence document’ in the UK.422 Thirdly, the ‘white knight’ 
defence can be implemented, which is where the target company seeks another 
company or individual to purchase its stock on a friendly basis.423 The ‘white knight’ is 
the ‘nice guy’.424 It could result in the company losing its independence.425 In this 
instance the directors would still have to obtain shareholder approval.426 
 
Derivative Action 
In the UK, as is the case elsewhere, a shareholder can use the derivative action to 
challenge a decision made by the board of directors.427 The origin of the derivative 
action can be found in, Foss v Harbottle,428 where the court held that if a wrong has 
been committed against the company the proper plaintiff to institute an action to recover 
damages would be the company itself.429 However, where the wrong was committed by 
those in control of the company it is doubtful that they would bring an action against 
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The regime in the UK is materially similar to that in South Africa.432 This is to be 
expected as the South African takeover regime is based on that of the UK.433 In both 
regimes the principle of board neutrality is entrenched in legislation.434 The most notable 
difference is that in order to take frustrating action in South Africa the approval of both 
the TRP and the relevant security holders are required whereas in the UK only 
shareholder approval is required.435 
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II The United States 
In the US the target board, when faced with a hostile takeover, will usually first 
approach the courts with an injunction restraining the acquirer from proceeding with the 
offer alleging that it is in breach of either securities legislation or anti-trust laws.436 
 
Federal Regulation of Tender Offers 
On a federal level takeovers are regulated by the Williams Act of 1968.437 This amended 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (‘the Exchange Act’).438 Amendments were 
required as there was a gap in the legislature.439 It is noteworthy to mention that a 
bidder has a greater chance of acquiring control by making a public offer to buy a 
specified number of tendered shares during a certain time at a premium in relation to 
the market price.440 
 
The Securities Exchange Commission (‘the SEC’) is an independent supervisory 
body.441 It regulates tender offers in the US but not in the same manner as the Takeover 
Panel’s in the UK and South Africa as it focuses on disclosure and not the duties of 
directors during a takeover.442 
 
The Williams Act applies to offers for securities of ‘public corporations whose securities 
are registered with the Securities Exchange Commission under s12’,443 which is in turn 
required under s12 and 15 of the Exchange Act.444 The Exchange Act lays down 
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minimum substantive procedural requirements.445 The Act is triggered where any tender 
offer would result in the bidder holding more than 5 per cent of the target companies 
equity securities.446 The term ‘tender offer’ is not defined in either the Williams Act or the 
Securities Exchange Rules.447 
 
The Exchange Act explicitly provides that the SEC can enforce the Williams Act in a 
Federal Court448 but the Act does not make provision for a private cause of action.449 
This raises issues such as who has standing and what remedies are available.450 The 
purpose of regulating takeover law is similar to that of the UK, which is to ensure that 
stock holders are provided with sufficient information and sufficient time in order to 
make a well-informed decision.451 The Williams Act has been criticized as being pro-
target company.452 In the years immediately after passing the Williams Act studies 
reflected that takeover premiums increased substantially and the amount of takeover 
bids declined.453 The Act regulates disclosure but not the defensive mechanisms that a 
target company can take thus resulting in the potential of an uneven playing field.454   
 
State Regulation of Tender Offers 
US Corporate law is predominantly regulated at state level,455 as in the law of the state 
in which the company has been incorporated.456 It is also regulated by the charter 
documents of the company.457 Takeover law in particular is regulated by various 
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statues.458 Naturally, the state laws on tender offers must not conflict with or bring 
discourse to the objectives of federal laws as this would impact on the ability of 
Congress to regulate interstate commercial dealings.459 As a result state laws on tender 
offers closely resemble the state company law.460 
 
Securities legislation was passed in the late 1960’s almost simultaneously with the UK 
City Code.461 The legislation was not as strict as that of the UK in that defensive 
mechanisms became commonplace and directors were given carte blanche to 
implement them as they deemed appropriate.462 In the 1980’s the courts in Delaware 
endorsed this practice of implementing takeover defences.463 
 
Poison Pill 
The poison pill was created in the 1980’s heyday of hostile takeovers by Martin 
Lipton.464 The Delaware Supreme Court has upheld its validity, and over and above this, 
no state has banned its use.465 The poison pill is considered a ‘show stopper’466 in the 
US.467 It is by far the most widely used defensive mechanism and it is thought to be the 
most effective in warding off inadequate hostile takeovers.468 The ultimate purpose of it 
is to make the shares of the target company less attractive to the acquirer by ensuring 
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that if the acquirer did take over the company, this would actually have an unprofitable 
result.469 
 
Its effect is even more potent when it becomes apparent that it can be adopted by a 
company at any time by a board resolution.470 It is generally adopted prior to an actual 
hostile offer by being drafted into the founding documents of a company and therefore 
most companies are managed under a ‘shadow poison pill’.471 All defensive 
mechanisms are subjected to the Unocal test, which is a test that must be satisfied in 
order to implement a takeover defence; 472 it will be discussed further below.  
 
Broadly speaking the poison pill can take two forms: dilution of rights and the 
shareholder rights plan.473 With the former, when any entity owns more than a specified 
amount of stock, the board purchases additional stock at a discount; this then dilutes 
the interest of the bidder and makes it necessary for the bidder to acquire more shares 
to acquire control of the target.474 There are various features to the shareholders right 
plan.475 It is where a shareholder is issued ‘one stock purchase right per share of 
common stock’.476 Initially the rights are valueless, however once the bidder reaches a 
certain threshold, usually 15 to 20 per cent of the all the stock of the company, the 
poison pill is triggered and consequently the shareholders rights are triggered.477 The 
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shareholder is then entitled to purchase a certain amount of stock, either in the target or 
in the acquirer, depending on the type of plan, at a discounted price.478  
 
As a result of the above, bidders are cautious not to ‘swallow’ the poison pill, ie by 
acquiring sufficient stock to trigger it.479 It is virtually impossible to takeover a target 
company whilst a poison pill is in place.480 The target can ‘redeem’ a poison pill, ie 
eliminate it.481 If an acquirer cannot persuade a target to redeem a poison pill it can 
attempt to launch a proxy or voting contest to take control of the target board.482 This is 
where the bidder appeals to the shareholders of the target company to remove the 
board of directors so that the shareholders will be able to elect a new board and this 
board will redeem the poison pill, now making it possible for the acquirer to take 
control.483 Proxy contests are however rare as they are costly and difficult to undergo.484 
Most bidders prefer a hostile tender offer over a proxy contest as it provides an element 
of surprise and thus a better chance of being successful.485 Also, even if a bidder failed 
it could still make a profit by selling its ‘toehold’486 position stock in the company.487 
 
Defensive Mechanism Debate 
The core purpose of defensive tactics is to serve as a deterrent to a potential acquirer. 
Defensive mechanisms can make the process of acquiring control of the target 
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company a time consuming and expensive one. The more expensive it becomes the 
riskier it is for the acquirer. This may encourage acquirers to instead seek the 
cooperation of the board by instead using a friendly approach.488 
 
On the other hand it can be argued that it should be allowed as it enables negotiation to 
take place and during this process a better deal could be negotiated for the 
shareholders, as previously discussed.489 Empirical studies have indicated that a board 
that negotiates usually yields a better deal for shareholders.490 Also, if it is a bad deal 
the company should have a means of protecting itself.491 Defensive mechanisms can be 
used to deter ‘weak or destructive bids’.492 A hostile takeover could be bad for many 




As previously mentioned, most corporations in the US are incorporated in Delaware for 
an array of reasons,494 notably, the fact that companies prefer the flexibility of common 
law.495 Companies have different needs at different times therefore it strikes one as 
appropriate and accords with a sense of justice that the court will take all of the 
circumstances into account when making a judgment.496 The nature of the judgments is 
also such that they can be used as a guide by other companies.497 
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 The position in the US is a polar opposite to that of the UK. First, the US allows an 
array of defensive mechanisms that may be taken by the board of directors without 
shareholder approval thereby placing the power in the hands of the directors as 
opposed to the shareholders. Secondly, the US has flexible common law rules that are 
applied as opposed to the bright line rules used in the UK. Defensive mechanisms are 
used as negotiating tool in US, and not necessarily to frustrate the bid. Once a target 
board implements a defensive action they often negotiate with the potential acquirers to 
obtain a better deal for the shareholders.498 
 
There is no Takeover Panel in the US similar to that in the UK and SA.499 However, it 
would be inappropriate to establish a similar body with the rules that are presently 
enforced in the US.500 The rules would basically empower this body to decide whether it 
is a good deal or a bad deal based on the effect that it has on the shareholders and the 
company.501 One of the general principles of the UK City Code (which has also been 
implemented in South Africa) is that the Panel is not to make rulings based on financial 
concerns: that is not its purpose.502 It should rather focus on equity.503 
 
Business Judgment Rule: The US 
The business judgment rule is the test used for the duty of care.504 As discussed, this 
rule is now used in South Africa.505 A crucial safety check when the court applies this 
test is that if there is a reasonable business purpose for the decision of the board, the 
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court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the boards.506  There is an ‘entire 
fairness’ test applied where there is a conflict of interest or other circumstances 
indicative of bad faith.507 
 
Pre-Unocal: ‘Dominant- Motive’ Review 
To determine whether directors were taking defensive action in order to entrench their 
positions, the initial test used by the court was to ascertain whether the board could 
demonstrate a reasonable investigation into a business purpose for the defensive 
mechanism.508 Once the board discharged this burden it fell to the challenger to prove 
that the dominant motive of the boards’ defensive action was entrenchment of their 
position.509  
 
This test was heavily criticized by academics as being laborious and failing to take 
account of the structure of the board which favoured entrenchment.510 The courts 
abundantly accepted virtually any business purpose used as a defensive mechanism.511 
It basically gave directors free reign to implement defences without the required checks 
and balances.512  
 
Unocal Test 
The Delaware Supreme Court in 1985 in the landmark case of Unocal Corp. V Mesa 
Petroleum Co513 established an ‘enhanced duty business judgment rule’ in 
circumstances where the board has decided to implement a defensive measure to 
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frustrate a hostile takeover.514 It is also known as the Unocal test, proportionality test or 
enhanced judicial scrutiny test.515 It reversed the onus of proof to the director (which is 
thought to be a step in the right direction).516 The court pronounced that the rationale for 
an enhanced test was due to the fact that there was a possibility that the board may be 
implementing a defensive mechanism for their own interests in order to entrench 
themselves517 rather than that the defensive mechanism was in the best interests of the 
company.518 
 
To satisfy the test there is a two prong enquiry.519 As a preliminary issue the target 
board is obligated to determine if the offer is in the best interests of the company and its 
shareholders.520 In order to satisfy the test the board must fulfil both legs of the test521 
and must show that reasonable grounds existed for the belief that the corporate policy 
and effectiveness was being threatened and that its response to the threat was 
reasonable.522 
 
Leg one of the test is satisfied by showing due investigation on the part of the board.523 
Here, it must be borne in mind that, there does not have to be an actual threat to 
corporate policy but rather a perceived threat which warrants implementation of a 
defensive measure.524 The board should also show that the price tendered for the 
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shares was inadequate and that there was a strong likelihood that the majority of the 
shareholders would have tendered into the inadequate offer.525  
 
Leg two of the test is satisfied if the board can show that the defensive mechanism 
implemented was reasonable or proportionate to the threat.526 Crucial in this regard, is 
that the board cannot implement a defensive mechanism as a blanket rejection to all 
offers.527 The second leg ties in quite closely with the issue of how long a board can use 
a poison pill to ward off a hostile takeover.528 Other general considerations are the 
timing and nature of the particular offer, the effect on all stakeholders (in particular the 
shareholders) and the risk that the takeover will not materialize as implementation is not 
possible.529 The court will uphold the defensive mechanism as due fulfilment of the 
business judgment rule if it is found to be lawful and reasonable, and that the board 
exercised its discretion bona fide and with care.530 
 
The Unocal case left questions unanswered. When could a threat be said to be 
cognizable? When is an action taken by the board defensive and when is it plainly 
preventing an acquirer from making a bid? Lastly, how is it determined what a 
proportionate and reasonable action is in response to a definite threat?531   
 
The Delaware courts have applied the Unocal test inconsistently.532 In one case it 
relaxed the two prong test,533 in another it rejected the first leg of the test stating that the 
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test was not necessary.534 Finally, it was held that when applying the test the court 
should determine whether the decision of the board was reasonable, not whether it was 
perfect.535  
 
Notably, the jurisprudence changed with the times. During the 1980’s, the court 
exercised great caution and permitted board activism only where there were convincing 
justifications in addition to maximizing shareholder wealth. During the 90’s, the courts 
became more lenient and permitted defensive tactics more liberally. In the 2000’s, the 
court has more readily imposed fiduciary duties on the directors of the target board. 536   
 
The line of case law demonstrates that the application of the test is not clear cut but 
rather a complex affair.537 Critics have opined that the Delaware courts are too 
deferential to the management of a target company whereas others have praised it as 
providing directors with sufficient latitude to meaningfully react to bids on behalf of its 
stakeholders.538 
 
The Revlon Duty 
Soon after Unocal, in the case of Revlon, Inc. V MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.539 
the Delaware Supreme Court elaborated on circumstances in which the duty of the 
board changes from preservation of the target company to maximization of the value of 
the target company where the goal is to get the best price for the shareholders.540 It has 
come to be known as ‘the Revlon duty’.541 When this duty exists the board may not 
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implement defensive mechanisms to frustrate a bid.542 This duty arises when the board 
is offered various adequate bids.543 Since the bids are adequate the first leg of the 
Unocal test will not be satisfied as the bids would not be a threat to the ‘corporate policy 
and effectiveness’ of the target company.544 Therefore if the board is faced with only 
one offer, the defensive mechanism will be analyzed under the Unocal test.545 If it 
becomes clear that the dissolution, break up or sale of the company is inevitable then 
obtaining the highest price for the shareholders should be the driving force behind the 
decisions of the board.546 
 
Summary 
The takeover regime in the US is the opposite of that in South Africa and the UK.547  
Defensive mechanisms are widely employed, the board makes the decision and 
frustrating action is entrenched in the common law.548 The drawbacks are that the US 
does not have a Takeover Panel that serves a similar function to that of South Africa 
and the UK.549 The SEC in the US regulates issues of disclosure and does not focus on 
defensive mechanisms.550  It is submitted that the common law system, although 
providing flexibility and current decisions, breeds legal uncertainty, as a result of the 
inconsistency with which the Delaware  Supreme Court applies the Unocal test.551  
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The directors are given wide powers to implement defensive mechanisms.552 This 
power is balanced by the fiduciary duty imposed on directors which finds expression in 
the Unocal test.553  
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The takeover laws in Australia have been noted to be the most limiting of all capitalist 
nations.554 It is based on the Eggleston Principles which have embedded in them 
notions of equal opportunity and the protection of minority shareholders.555 The 
principles are codified in the Corporations Act (‘the Act’).556 Legislation regulating 
takeovers came into play in Australia in the early 1960’s.557 This is around the same 
time as the US and the UK.558 
 
Traditionally, Australia adopted a fiduciary duty analysis but the Takeover Panel now 
uses a Guidance Note on Frustrating Action.559 The Corporate Law Economic Reform 
Program provided that one of the main aims was to ensure that the shareholders of the 
target company made the decision as to whether to accept or reject the bid.560 Australia 
is therefore shareholder centric like the UK and South Africa.561  
 
Market for Corporate Control 
Of the completed mergers and acquisitions transactions, involving companies listed on 
the Australian Stock Exchange (‘the ASX’) as target companies, 18.7 per cent were 
hostile takeovers.562 Whether the presence of blockholders in Australia will influence the 
frequency of hostile takeovers depends on whether a blockholder has a good 
relationship with management, if so, there is a slim likelihood of a hostile takeover 
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occurring as the blockholder will not vote in favour of it.563 Of the 18.7 per cent only 7.2 
per cent were successful.564 This is considerably lower than the statistics in the US and 
the UK.565 Studies reveal that the majority of Australian companies defeat hostile 
takeovers.566 It is thought that this can attributed to the close relationship between 
blockholders and management.567 This is very different to the US, where, despite the 
fact that defensive measures are more readily implemented, it generally results in a 
better negotiated deal for shareholders and not in the defeat of a hostile takeover.568  
 
Regulatory Framework 
The takeover provisions are contained in Chapter 6 of the Act.569 The relevant sections 
will apply to listed entities, listed managed investment schemes and to unlisted 
companies provided they have more than fifty members.570 When Australian takeover 
law was reviewed the Eggleston Committee provided that when a bidder makes an offer 
that can result in him acquiring a substantial interest in a company, it was vital to ensure 
that certain requirements are met, these requirements came to be known as the 
Eggleston Principles.571 These principles underlie takeover law and are codified in s602 
of the Act which sets out the purposes of the takeover provisions.572 It provides that in a 
takeover it is essential to ensure that the shareholders and directors are provided with 
all the relevant information.573 In particular, that they are aware of the bidders identity.574 
                                                           
563
 Anil Shivdasani, ‘Board Composition, Ownership Structure and Hostile Takeovers' (1993) 16 Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 167 as cited by Dignam and Galanis op cit note 308 at 640, footnote 100. 
564
 Stapledon op cit note 290 at 331. 
565
 Ibid at 331. 
566
 Dignam and Galanis op cit note 308 at 641.  
567
 Ibid.  
568
 G William Schwert ‘Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder?’ (2000) 55 Journal of Finance 2599 at 
2609, 2624-2632, and 2638-2639 as cited by Dignam and Galanis op cit note 308 at footnote 98, 100 and 100, 
respectively. 
569
 Austin and Ramsay op cit note 36 at 1349. 
570
 Section 602(a)(i)-(iii). 
571
 Second Interim Report to the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General on ‘Disclosure of Substantial 
Shareholdings and Takeovers’ (Feb 1969) paper no 43 Company Law Advisory Committee at 6. 
572
 Austin and Ramsay op cit note 36 at 1357-1358. 
573
 Section 602(b)(iii). 
574











Second, that sufficient time is provided to assess the merits of the offer.575 And lastly, 
that all shareholders have an equal opportunity to participate in any benefit which arises 
as a result of the offer.576 The purposes are so that well informed decisions are made 
based on the merits of the offer.577 It is also to ensure an efficient and competitive 
market.578 
 
The takeover provisions contain a general prohibition against a person or persons 
entering into a transaction which results in that person or persons acquiring voting 
power in excess of the threshold 20 per cent of the shares or an increase of their voting 
power where that person already has above 20 per cent and they acquire shares that 
result in them holding between 20 per cent and 90 per cent.579 The most important 
exception is where the acquisition is as a result of the acceptance of a takeover bid.580 
The Act recognises two types of takeover bids: market and off-market bids.581 There are 
various differences between the two.582 
 
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (‘the ASIC’) is the national 
securities regulator.583 It has the power to grant an exemption from compliance with the 
takeover provisions.584 This is important in the context of Australia which was criticised 
for its so-called ‘black-letter’ takeover law.585 The Takeover Panel is established in 
terms of the ASIC Act.586 It can review decisions of the ASIC587 and in turn the decisions 
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of the Panel are subject to judicial review.588 The Takeover Panel replaced the 
Corporations and Securities Panel, which was established to resolve disputes arising 
from takeovers589 primarily to prevent parties from resorting to litigation as a tactic to 
frustrate a hostile takeover.590  
 
Frustrating Action 
The Panel publishes what is called Guidance Notes.591 These notes provide how it 
intends to exercise its powers under the Act.592 Guidance Note 12 deals with frustrating 
action and defines it as an action by a target company which frustrates a takeover bid 
and due to this action a bid lapses or is withdrawn or a potential bid, which is a bid that 
the offeror has informed the target company of, fails.593 In a landmark case of Re 
Pinnacle VRB Ltd594 the Pinnacle (No 8) principle was developed.595 This principle 
placed the emphasis of the frustrating action on the effect of the decision made by the 
directors instead of the purpose for which they made their decision.596  
 
Interestingly, a distinction is often drawn between defence ‘strategies’ and defence 
‘tactics’.597 A tactic is in response to an impending bid whereas a strategy is something 
that was planned and already in place for the purpose of defending against a bid.598 All 
actions of directors are subject to their general duty to act in the best interests of the 
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company and to use their powers for a proper purpose.599 Guidance Note 12 provides 
that its general policy is that shareholders, rather than directors, should make decisions 
which may have an impact on the ability of shareholders to participate equally in an 
offer or incident which have an effect on their control and ownership.600 For these policy 
reasons there are limits to the defensive actions that directors may take to defend 
against a hostile takeover.601 An example of this is that the board of a target company, 
may not, without the prior approval of the shareholders, issue shares for three months 
from the date that the target company is informed in writing, that another person or 
entity is making or has proposed a takeover.602 This becomes relevant when target 
boards want to implement the ‘white knight’ defence.603 
 
The action of a target board may warrant a declaration of unacceptable circumstances 
by the Panel, in other words, not every action which has the effect of frustrating a bid 
will give rise to a declaration of unacceptable circumstances.604 The Panel has 
extensive authority to make orders including preventing or unwinding a transaction or 
action and requiring shareholder approval.605 It can also override directors’ decisions.606 
If a possibility exists that the action by directors could frustrate a bid, the Panel will 
generally require that the shareholders at the very least have an opportunity to consider 
the merits.607  
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Initially, the Act contained a definition of ‘unacceptable circumstances’ and it would only 
make a declaratory order if one of the conditions, based on the Eggleston Principles, 
were met.608 The Panel opined that the ‘black-letter’ law of the takeover provisions 
would not be sufficient to deal with all the circumstances that may arise.609 
 
A declaration of unacceptable circumstances is now governed by s657A(2) of the Act.610 
An application can be made by any person whose interests have been affected such as 
the target, the bidder or the ASIC.611 The Panel cannot act on its own motion.612 The 
term ‘unacceptable circumstances’ is not defined in the Act; however, the word 
‘unacceptable’ implies that the circumstances cannot continue as is and that they 
necessitate consideration.613  
 
When making a decision regarding a declaration the Panel must have regard to the 
conditions set out in the subsection, the purposes of the takeover provisions as 
provided in s602 and any other relevant matter.614 The Panel must also take into 
consideration whether the declaration will be against public interest.615 
 
Guidance Note 12 
The Note provides examples as to what the Panel may view as frustrating action, but 
they are just that, examples.616 It does not mean that if one of the examples provided 
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appear before the Panel that it will on that basis conclude that it is a frustrating action.617 
Examples of frustrating action include a substantial issue or repurchase of shares; the 
acquisition or disposal of an important asset; substantial change to the terms of a 
liability or share plans of the company; and the declaration of an extraordinary 
dividend.618 
 
An offeror can make its offer subject to conditions, once an action triggers a condition it 
amounts to a frustrating action.619 Whether the frustrating action gives rise to 
unacceptable circumstances depends on the effect that it has on shareholders and the 
market.620 The Panel has regard to an array of circumstances surrounding the bid and 
the frustrating action.621  It is interesting to note what is considered.  
 
With regard to considerations surrounding the bid the Panel will evaluate the period for 
which the offer has been open,622 the prospects of the transaction being implemented623 
and whether there are any commercially significant conditions attached to the bid.624 
The type of conditions that the Guidance Note lists are those that may be too 
restrictive,625 or conditions that require the cooperation of the target board,626 or 
conditions that prevent the target board from seeking alternative offers627 or a condition 
that the target company enter into a major transaction that it did not envisage.628 
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With regard to consideration surrounding the frustrating action the Panel will have 
regard to whether there are alternative offers, whether there is a business rationale 
behind the frustrating action or whether it was taken in the ordinary course of the targets 
business.629 
 
Examples are provided of action that may give rise to unacceptable circumstances630 
and those that will not.631 
 
The following are some examples of actions that may give rise to unacceptable 
circumstances:  
(a) issuing new shares (or convertible securities), or repurchasing shares, if 
significant in the context of the target’s issued capital or the bid 
(b) acquiring a major asset, including by making a takeover bid, or disposing of 
one  
(c) undertaking significant liabilities or materially changing the terms of its debt 
(where the takeover would not have given rise to these changes)  
(d) declaring a special or abnormally large dividend  
(e) significantly changing company share plans or  
(f) entering into joint ventures.632 
 
Interestingly it will generally not give rise to unacceptable circumstances if the 
frustrating action leads to the target company choosing between two offers633 or 
requiring shareholder approval or making a decision conditional upon shareholder 
approval.634 If shareholder approval is required the Panel will consider a number of 
listed things.635 Also, if the target company does not cooperate, ‘seeks alternatives’ or 
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rejects the bid it generally will not result in a declaration of unacceptable 
circumstances.636 
 
The Panel provides explicitly that it does not apply director’s duties but instead creates 
its own duties and obligations.637 Therefore, regardless of directors’ duties a frustrating 
action can give rise to unacceptable circumstances.638 
 
Summary 
Australia has been referred to as the middle ground between the UK and the US.639 
This is due to the fact that the restrictions on frustrating action are not quite as strict as 
the UK however frustrating action is strongly discouraged; therefore it is not as liberally 
used as in the US.640 The ability of directors to implement defensive mechanisms is 
limited, especially with regard to listed companies.641 
 
Australia has a blended regulatory regime.642 The Guidance Note on frustrating action is 
a guideline but the declaration of an unacceptable circumstance connected to the 
frustrating action is legislative.643 This provides a certain degree of flexibility but also 
with the assurance and support of the legislature.644  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion- Preferred Approach 
 
Economic Climate in SA 
Empirical studies in the UK have shown that the prohibition of hostile takeovers 
increased the amount of successful hostile takeovers.645 The economic climate in South 
Africa is unique as a result of the political system of apartheid that was in force.646 This 
system enforced racial segregation and the aftermath still reflects in the demographics 
of shareholders.647 There are policies in place to address this and it is aimed at 
shareholder democracy.648 The term ‘shareholder democracy’ encapsulates the 
influence that shareholders have on the direction of a company and in promoting their 
own interests within that structure.649 Many corporate governance principles developed 
in the King Report are now reflected in company legislation.650  The King Reports have 
an undertone of political and social transformation and therefore differ from equivalent 
international documents.651 
 
South Africa now has a democratic system and has an obligation not only as the leading 
economy in Africa, but, also, as a hub of natural resources, to advance the economy.652 
Black entrepreneurs struggle to break into the shareholder market for a number of 
reasons.653 One is the struggle to secure funds.654 Another is the fact that the mindset of 
other key game players have not shifted and as result they do not appreciate the 
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significance of BBBEE transactions for the sustainable growth of the economy and to 
create ownership that reflects the demographics.655 
 
The primary objective of takeover law in South Africa is to protect stakeholder interests, 
the secondary interest is to develop investment.656 However, there must be a balance 
between the protection of stakeholders, particularly the minority shareholders, and the 
encouragement of economic activity.657 If the legislation places too much emphasis on 
the protection of shareholders of target companies it could make takeovers expensive 
and disproportionately burdensome, thereby discouraging possible bidders and 
investors.658 Of particular significance in South Africa is the safeguarding of the 
disenfranchised and minorities.659  
 
There are hardly any hostile takeovers in South Africa and regulators do not seem to 
have the ability to deal with it constructively when it arises.660 The most well-known 
attempts at a hostile takeover that have occurred recently were both defeated.661  These 
are that of Standard Bank by Nedbank and that of Goldfields by Harmony Gold.662  
 
Why Shareholders Should not Decide 
It is argued that the drawbacks of defending against a hostile takeover do not 
sufficiently outweigh the benefits and as a result the board should be able to defend 
against these types of takeovers.663 The aggressive US approach where directors have 
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wide discretion to implement defensive action would not be appropriate in the context of 
South Africa’s history of disenfranchisement.664  
 
In South Africa the general rule is that frustrating action is prohibited when an offer has 
been received or when it is imminent.665 The exception to this general rule is when the 
specific frustrating action is approved by the TRP and the shareholders or if it is in terms 
of a pre-existing agreement or obligation entered into before an offer was received or 
was imminent.666  
 
Earlier it was discussed that there are two schools of thought with regard to whether a 
shareholder or the board of directors should approve frustrating action.667 I submit that 
the ultimate decision should not lie with the shareholders.668 Despite being the owners 
of the company there are too many indicators that if the ultimate decision laid with the 
shareholders that their decision may actually be to their detriment.669 It is idealistic that 
primarily based on this notion of ownership that shareholders should decide.670 
 
Generally, in modern corporate law there is a high shareholder turnover, coupled with 
the fact that their interests and incentives differ vastly depending on what type of 
shareholders they are.671 This in turn as evinced affects whether they are long term or 
short term shareholders and whether they are keen activists.672  Interestingly, a case in 
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the US was decided based on the differing interests of shareholders.673 The case 
concerned the maintenance of a poison pill during a hostile takeover.674 The court noted 
that the economic incentives and preferences were sufficiently different to warrant 
individual treatment.675 
 
In Chapter 4 the importance of shareholder activism was discussed. This concept 
encompasses the involvement of a shareholder in a company.676 It is presumed that if 
the shareholder is involved in the company that he or she will be knowledgeable as to 
the operations and performance of the company thus being able to participate valuably 
in decisions made as decisions will be made on an informed basis.677 The main 
shareholders in South Africa are institutional shareholders.678 Logically, as discussed, it 
is thought that they would be keen activists as they have the resources at their disposal; 
however, studies have shown that they are in fact apathetic in this regard.679 One 
argument as to why shareholders should decide is that shareholders take all the risks, 
however, the risk of institutional shareholders put into context is not that big of a risk, as 
compared to the type of risk it would be for an individual shareholder.680 Individual 
shareholders are the minority shareholders in South Africa and they do not have the 
resources to be active shareholders, over and above this, they lack the incentive to be 
active because they cannot justify expending time and money when it is thought that 
their decisions will not have a large impact as they are bound by the majority rule.681 
 
If one assesses that the two major groups of shareholders in South Africa are not keen 
activists it becomes difficult to justify why the decision to take frustrating action should 
                                                           
673
 Air Products supra note 525. 
674




 Sutherland op cit note 3 at 79. 
677
 Aronson supra note 261 at 811; Boardman op cit note 13 at 333. 
678
 Matsaneng op cit note 205 at 31. 
679
 Armour and Skeel op cit note 142 at 1748 (Table 2); Short and Keasey op cit note 307 at 25. 
680
 Schuitema op cit note 271 at 14. 
681











lay with them as they do not know the position of the company and therefore whether 
the frustrating action will be the best decision or not.682 Also, shareholders may not be 
sufficiently competent to make an informed decision.683 
 
Due to the concern for the minority shareholders in South Africa, it is understandable 
that the legislature may be reluctant to disenfranchise them in this manner, however, 
considering that it could ultimately benefit them, the end may justify the means.684 Also, 
it was discussed that shareholders hardly make use of their power to remove directors; 
it begs the question whether they would participate and use their power to make a 
decision regarding frustrating action.685 
 
Guidelines of the TRP 
When the TRP makes a decision whether to approve frustrating action the natural 
inquiry that follows is the basis on which this decision is made. It is astonishing that this 
power was given to the TRP yet there is no guideline as to how to use it. This means 
that the TRP will have wide powers when making a decision as to whether to allow 
frustrating action. One can assume that they will be guided by the objects of the TRP.686 
 
As discussed, Australia has a blended system as it uses hard and fast rules as found in 
their Corporations Act and they also use the Guidance Note which is a guideline used 
by the Takeover Panel.687 It is submitted that the Guidance Note plays an invaluable 
role in bringing practical considerations to the forefront and not merely seeing the law as 
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black-and-white.688 The importance of flexibility in the area of takeover law was 
raised.689 This area of law is time sensitive, ever changing and complex.690 Australia 
has the benefit of the enforcement of the legislature691 (which, as discussed, is what the 
previous UK and South African system was lacking) and the luxury of the capability of 
taking cognisance of realistic circumstances.692 It is submitted that South Africa would 
benefit greatly from this type of flexibility. 
 
Should the Board Decide Then? 
 I argued above that the ultimate decision should not lie with the shareholders of the 
company. In the same vein I do not believe that it is wise for the directors to have 
exclusive power either. I do however believe that it is preferable to let the decision lay 
with the board. I will therefore proceed to consider the main reasons against the board 
deciding and discuss the check and balance that is found in the fiduciary duties of 
directors.693 
 
The main argument as to why directors should not decide is that they are motivated by 
self-interest.694 As discussed, this finds reflection in two ways: they look to entrench 
their positions in the company after new management has taken over or if they cannot 
remain in the company post hostile takeover, they will seek to secure a form of 
compensation.695 
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It is not so simple for directors to entrench themselves any longer.696 In terms of the 
2008 Companies Act they can be removed by a simple majority, therefore, at first 
glance, this makes that argument moot in South Africa.697 However, studies have shown 
that shareholders rarely make use of their power to remove directors.698 This is 
connected to shareholder apathy.699 It illustrates that further measures are required to 
ensure that the board does not abuse its power. 
 
In the US the problem of entrenchment is different: due to the staggered board 
system.700 It was mentioned that during a hostile bid proxy contests are used to oust a 
target board but these contests are rare due to the costs.701 Therefore, there is no real 
threat of removal and the safety mechanisms are notably deficient.702 
 
In terms of the 2008 Act the board manages the company therefore they are more 
informed than shareholders and as a result would probably make better decisions.703 In 
managing the company the board must fulfil its fiduciary duties, the fundamental one 
being to make decisions in the best interests of the company.704  The ‘company’, as 
discussed, refers to the shareholders of the company.705 The fiduciary duty of directors 
indicates that the interests of the board members are similar, unlike shareholders who, 
do not owe a fiduciary duty towards the company and have differing interests.706  There 
is a check and balance in place for directors as their decisions are subject to their 
fiduciary duty, however, there is no such balancing provision for the decisions of 
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shareholders.707 Also, South Africa practises the stakeholder inclusive approach which 
ensures that when making decisions the board takes the interests of all stakeholders 
into account to the extent that it is in the best interest of the company and the term 
‘company’ generally refers to shareholders.708 This, coupled with the fear of removal will 
ensure that shareholder interests are serviced by the board.709 
 
In conclusion therefore I have aimed to rebut the two main arguments against the board 
being given the power to decide the outcome of a bid.710 To summarise, the first 
standpoint with regard to entrenchment is countered by the argument that directors 
cannot easily entrench themselves under the 2008 Act.711 With regard to directors 
compensation, the board has a fiduciary duty to make decisions in the best interests of 
the company therefore the compensation could breach their fiduciary duties.712 This 
also encapsulates two of the safety mechanism that would make it preferable for the 
board to make decisions as to frustrating action, first their fiduciary duty and second, 
that they can easily be removed.713  
 
The third safety mechanism is built into the Act and provides that only independent 
directors of a target board can participate in decision making and voting.714 It does not 
provide what an independent director is but rather states what a non-independent 
director is and creates a rebuttable presumption in each circumstance.715 For example, 
there is a rebuttable presumption that a director who is on the board of the target and 
the acquiring firm is a non-independent director.716 Also, the Act provides that the target 
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board must obtain advice from an independent expert when considering an offer.717 It 
must take cognisance of this advice when providing its opinion to the shareholders.718 
This attempts to ensure that decisions of the board are well informed and that they 
remain unbiased.719 
 
Should South Africa have a Common Law Regime? 
Delaware takeover law uses a common law system that has many benefits.720 First, one 
that applies in general when law is regulated via common law is the gradual and natural 
development of the law.721 It allows the users of the law to adjust.722 The overarching 
advantages in relation to this particular area of law is that it allo s the law to keep up 
with the times (‘market demands’)723 and as a result it allows flexibility.724 The board is 
able to consider all the surrounding circumstances in order to determine what will be in 
the best interests of the company and its shareholders.725  
 
The major disadvantage is that the Delaware courts have applied their takeover law 
inconsistently.726 This inconsistency breeds legal uncertainty.727 It is a major flaw, 
however, if imported into a different legal system, like South Africa, it can be used with 
the knowledge of lessons learnt by the Delaware system and our courts can apply their 
minds consistently.728 The inconsistency in the Delaware system could also be 
attributed to the fluctuating nature of commerce.729 Also, that inconsistency could also 
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be a problem for a Takeover Panel.730 The Australian Guidance Note provides 
reassurance that the Panel has knowledge of what is relevant.731 In a more recent 
takeover regime as that in South Africa this guidance and reassurance is even more 
crucial to instil faith in the regime of those who must use it.732 
 
As previously discussed, there is a significantly higher incidence of derivative 
proceedings in the US than in the UK.733 Due to this the shareholders in the UK do not 
fulfil the ‘controlling mechanism’ role to the extent that the shareholders in the US do.734 
The US is known to be a litigious nation, South Africa, not to the same extent, for this 
reason the common law system may not be appropriate.735 
 
South Africa and the UK have a similar system, this is due largely to the fact the South 
African takeover regime is based on that of the UK.736 The systems are based on hard 
and fast, bright line rules.737 The advantage in this regard, is clear, it provides legal 
certainty.738 This translates into a reduction in legal fees because parties will not, for 
example, have to consult as to a particular position in the law.739 The UK takeover rules 
‘appear both more complete and focused’740 than those of Delaware.741 
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Permissible Preventative Action 
The non-frustration rules found in the South African Companies Act gives the 
impression that there is nothing that a target board would be able to do when faced with 
a hostile bid.742 I will discuss whether the permissible defences used in the UK, as 
discussed above, are plausible for South Africa, considering that the regimes are 
similar.743  
 
In South Africa, directors have invoked competition law as a backdoor defence.744 It has 
been argued that in order for the non-frustration rule to have full force, competition law 
and company law must be reconciled.745 Harmony Gold Limited attempted a hostile 
takeover of Gold Fields Limited; however, Gold Fields resisted it in terms of the 
Competition Act in what has loosely been referred to as the ‘competition card’746 by 
applying for an interdict to stop the takeover as there was a lack of compliance with the 
Competition Act.747 Ultimately, the Competition Appeal Court granted the interdict.748  
 
In South Africa the ‘defence document’ is known as an ‘offeree response circular’.749  
The purpose is to provide the shareholders of the target company with all the relevant 
information and the view of the board on the proposed offer.750 It must contain an array 
of information including whether the board accepts or rejects the offer and whether 
individual directors will vote for or against the offer in relation to their own relevant 
securities.751 The circular is essentially a document containing information which is 
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published by the company to the holders of its securities.752 With regard to the white 
knight defence, it is submitted that due to the anti-avoidance provisions that this would 
not be possible in South Africa, it would reduce the very purpose of the general principle 
against frustrating action contained in s119.753 
 
Derivative Action 
This derivative action used as a remedy in the UK and the US can also be found in s165 
of the 2008 Act.754 The 2008 Act has revoked the common law derivative action and 
replaced s266 of the 1973 Act.755 The derivative action can be brought by someone else 
in the name of the company for the purposes of protecting the ‘legal interests’ of the 
company.756 The term ‘legal interests’ is not defined in the 2008 Act.757 It is quite broad 
and thus allows more protection for the company and in essence then the minority 
shareholders.758 
 
The purpose for which the derivative action exists in South Africa is the same as that of 
the US- if the management of the company does not institute an action then the 
shareholders may.759 When bringing the action the shareholder asserts that the 
negligence of mismanagement by the board resulted in the company suffering 
economic injury.760 It is indirectly used as a method to enforce the fiduciary duties of 
directors.761 
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In the UK, the percentage of hostile takeovers challenged using the derivative action is 
drastically lower than in the US.762 This is so for a number of reasons, mainly because 
derivative actions are simply more lucrative for legal professionals in the US to bring,763 
also, the UK has a statutory authority system in place whereas the US does not.764 
Statute provides certain remedies and consequences.765  Between 1990 and 2005, 33.9 
per cent of hostile takeovers in the US were challenged using the derivative action.766 In 
the UK the figure is 0.1 per cent.767 
 
Its is submitted that there is no reason why the derivative action cannot be used in the 
same way in South Africa, especially with the introduction of the term ‘legal interests’ 
widening the ambit of matters that can be brought in terms of the remedy.768 In any 




The regime in South Africa is strict in comparison to that of the UK, US and Australia.770 
Understandably, the history and economic climate differs to that of its first world 
comparatives.771 However, South Africa should look to these countries as examples.772 
 
                                                           
762
 Ibid at 121. 
763
 Saulsbury op cit note 8 at 121; Armour and Skeel op cit note 142 at 1744-1745. 
764








 Coetzee op cit note 171 at 298. 
769
 Section 165(2)(a). 
770
 This has been fully discussed. In the US defensive measures are commonplace. In Australia it is allowed but 
frowned upon. In the UK defensive measures may be taken with shareholder approval. In South Africa approval is 
required from shareholders and the TRP.  
771













It is submitted that the US culture of defensive mechanisms would not be appropriate in 
our context but also that a limited degree should be possible depending on the 
circumstances, like Australia.773 For the various reasons elaborated on above, it is 
submitted that the ultimate decision should not lie with the shareholders but instead with 
the directors as there are sufficient checks and balances to ensure that the drawbacks 
of allowing directors to decide are adequately managed.774 Also, there is sufficient 
protection for shareholders in the 2008 Act.775 The framework used in South Africa is 
commendable but it is submitted that a more flexible regime would be better suited.776 
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